The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 52
Number 1 Volume 52, Number 1 (2022)

Article 6

Spring 3-9-2022

China’s Global Monopoly on Rare-Earth Elements
Gustavo Ferreira
Jamie Critelli

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons,
Military History Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and
Public Administration Commons, Political History Commons, Public Affairs Commons, Strategic
Management Policy Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Gustavo Ferreira & Jamie Critelli, "China’s Global Monopoly on Rare-Earth Elements," Parameters 52, no. 1
(2022): 57-72, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3129.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Understanding a Changing China

China’s Global Monopoly on Rare-Earth Elements
Gustavo Ferreira and Jamie Critelli

©2022 Gustavo Ferreira and Jamie Critelli

A BSTR ACT: This a r ticle del ivers a novel economic ana lysis of
US dependence on China for rare-earth elements and sheds light on
how Western nations may exploit “limit pricing” to break China’s global
monopoly in rare-earth element production and refinement. This analytical
framework, supported by a comprehensive literature review, the application
of microeconomic and industrial organization concepts, and two case-study
scenarios, provides several policy recommendations to address an important
foreign policy challenge for the United States.
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T

he rise of China as a global economic and geopolitical superpower
is arguably the most important foreign policy challenge the United
States has faced since the end of the Cold War. Disputes between
the two countries have been geoeconomic in nature and revolve around issues
such as trade imbalances, limited market access, intellectual property theft, and
currency manipulation. At the same time, there is growing concern the two
nations are on a path to military confrontation and may not be able to avert the
Thucydides Trap—the tendency for conflict when an emerging power threatens
to displace existing hegemonies.
Following an escalation of diplomatic tensions, former President Donald J.
Trump launched a trade war in 2017 to pressure Beijing to implement significant
economic reforms and tackle unfair trade practices. As a result, the two nations
imposed tariffs worth hundreds of billions of dollars on one another’s goods.
More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the risks associated with the
concentration of goods production (for example, personal protective equipment
or medical supplies) in China and heightened concerns about China weaponizing
supply chains for geopolitical purposes. These growing tensions also revived
US concerns about its reliance on China as a primary source of rare-earth
elements (REE) and rare-earth element–based products (for example, oxides and
associated alloys).
Many critical military applications and industries use these elements as
an input to produce advanced electronics, hybrid vehicles, wind turbines,
magnets, and catalysts. More than a decade ago, pundits sounded the alarm
on China strengthening its dominance in the industry via its vast reserves and
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unparalleled ability to mine and refine these resources. A 2010 Government
Accountability Office report presented sobering statistics about China’s
dominance at all levels of the REE supply chain—the country produced
about 95 percent of the raw materials, 97 percent of oxides, and about
90 percent of the metal alloys.1 From a military perspective, the report stated
the US dependency on a potential adversary for critical resources could
shape the outcome of a military confrontation. For example, in a large-scale,
prolonged military conflict with Beijing over a dispute in the Taiwan Strait
or South China Sea, the US military industrial complex could find itself
struggling to secure the supplies needed to remain fully engaged in the fight.2
An early economic model explained how China emerged as the production
market leader. Through a sequence of four supply-and-demand models, the
model showed the gradual concentration of the REE supply chain in China.3
This article expands on this model and focuses on the use of limit pricing by
China to preserve its hegemony. The country’s state-owned producers recurrently
dialed up production and flooded global markets with cheap supplies to drive out
for-profit Western competitors, preclude the buildup of strategic stockpiles, and
discourage recycling programs. This article concludes recent market changes will
limit Beijing’s ability to manipulate prices for prolonged periods of time. Lastly,
market forces alone will not address the vulnerability. Any policy solutions must
involve significant and close cooperation with allies and sustained financial and
political backing by the US government.
State of Rare-Earth Elements
Over the last decade China has consistently demonstrated its dominance
of the REE global market. Following an incident in 2010 between a Chinese
trawler and the Japanese coast guard in the contested waters of the East
China Sea, Beijing stopped all shipments of these elements to Japan for
nearly two months. This decision disrupted Japan’s automotive industry, led
to global prices spikes, and generated a global rush to secure supplies. The
temporary price surge made it economically viable for previously mothballed
mines to reenter the market, exposed the inability of Western nations to fill
the temporary gap, and showed China was no longer a reliable long-term REE

1. Marc Humphries, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” Congressional Research Service
R41347, December 16, 2013.
2. Charles J. Butler, “Rare Earth Elements: China’s Monopoly and Implications for U.S. National Security,”
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 38, no. 1 (Winter 2014), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf.
3. Dominik Schlinkert and Karl Geraldvan den Boogaart, “The Development of the Market for Rare Earth
Elements: Insights from Economic Theory,” Resources Policy 46 (2015): 272–80.
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supplier; it also failed to persuade the US government and its allies to implement
long-term solutions to this dependency.
Consequently, China continued to expand its global dominance and is now
confidently wielding it as a geopolitical weapon. For example, in May 2020,
President Xi Jinping made a publicized visit to a magnet facility. A few days
later, an editorial by Xinhua (the government’s official state-run press agency)
warned that by “waging a trade war against China, the United States risks
losing the supply of materials that are vital to sustaining its technological
strength.”4 A month later, Beijing threatened US defense contractors with
sanctions following the approval of a $620 million deal to supply missile
parts to Taiwan. The PRC’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is
currently exploring future controls on REE production and exports to the United
States and Europe. Chinese officials also reached out to domestic producers to
assess how severely US defense contractors would be impacted by a disruption in
exports in the event of a diplomatic dispute between the two countries.5
A targeted supply-chain disruption could cripple production of consumer
products and weapons systems in the United States and its strategic partners.6 The
plausibility of this scenario represents a national security threat and intensifies
the debate amongst policymakers and business communities about the United
States’ ability to find viable alternatives to sources of rare-earth elements.
To that end, the Trump administration published Executive Order 13817,
“A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,”
in 2017. It outlines a comprehensive set of policies and strategic goals and pushes
for action in research and development, international cooperation, assessment
of domestic mineral resources, streamlining federal permitting processes, and
expansion of the workforce in this sector. These proposed actions highlight key
economic issues that need to be addressed to mitigate the US reliance on China
for rare-earth elements. In 2020, the federal government published Executive
Order 13953, “Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain from
Reliance on Critical Minerals from Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the
Domestic Mining and Processing Industries,” which directs US federal agencies

4. Wayne M. Morrison, “Trade Dispute with China and Rare Earth Elements,” Congressional Research
Service in Focus, June 28, 2019.
5. Sun Yu in Beijing and Demetri Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth Export Curbs to Hobble U.S.
Defense Industry” Financial Times, February 6, 2021.
6. Humphries, “Rare Earth Elements,” 7.
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to identify potential authorities and develop agency-specific plans to improve the
mining and processing of rare-earth elements.7
The Biden administration published Executive Order 14017, “America’s
Supply Chains,” requiring the US government to review critical supply chains
and assess the the country’s dependency on other nations for key resources
and technologies—to include “critical minerals” and other identified strategic
materials such as rare-earth elements, as determined by the Department
of Defense. This policy is likely to endure future political vicissitudes given
growing bipartisan calls for a gradual decoupling of the American and
Chinese economies. While these policies signal a strong commitment by the
US government to address this national security threat, their implementation
will take time to progress and will require sustained political backing, reliable
financial support by the US federal government, and the involvement of the
business community.
Production, Trade, and Uses
Production and Trade
Rare-earth elements are metals desired for unique characteristics of
magnetism, luminescence, and strength.8 Contrary to what the name suggests,
these elements are abundant in the earth’s crust. Their rarity comes from being
scattered, mixed with other minerals, and rarely found in concentrations that make
extraction profitable.9 In addition, rare-earth elements are often a by-product of
other major mining activities, and reserves are geographically more concentrated
than other natural resources (for example, oil or natural gas). Historically,
mineral production that is highly concentrated in one or few countries is
vulnerable to market manipulations and natural disasters, political changes, or
environmental problems.10 China holds 37 percent of the world’s REE reserves
(see table 1). Illustrative of the rapid decline of the US industry, in 2009, the

7. US Department of Energy, Critical Minerals and Materials: U.S. Department of Energy’s Strategy to Support
Domestic Critical Mineral and Material Supply Chains, FY 2021–FY 2031, January 20, 2021, www.energy.gov
/sites/prod/files/2021/01/f82/DOE%20Critical%20Minerals%20and%20Materials%20Strategy_0.pdf.
8. Yufeng Chen and Biao Zheng, “What Happens after the Rare Earth Crisis: A Systematic Literature
Review,” Sustainability (2019): 11, 1288, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/5/1288/htm.
9. Morrison, “Trade Dispute with China,” 1.
10. K. J. Schulzet al., “Chapter A, “Critical Mineral Resources of the United States—Economic and
Environmental Geology and Prospects for Future Supply,” in Critical Mineral Resources of the United States—An
Introduction, US Geological Survey Professional Paper 1802 (2017), A1–A14, https://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/1802
/a/pp1802a.pdf.
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United States accounted for 13 percent of these global reserves; a decade later, the
share was reduced to 1 percent (see table 1).11
Table 1. Geographic distribution of REE reserves (2019)
(Source: US Geological Survey, mineral commodity summaries, 2020)

Country
China
Vietnam
Brazil
Russia
India
Australia
Greenland
United States
Other
World

Reserves
44,000,000
22,000,000
22,000,000
12,000,000
6,900,000
3,300,000
1,500,000
1,400,000
6,900,000

120,000,000

Global Share
37%
18%
18%
10%
6%
3%
1%
1%
6%
100%

China has a greater lead in output as it accounted for 68 percent of
global production in 2019. This share is likely higher because illegal mining
and smuggling by the Chinese are not officially tracked. According to
estimates, between 50 to 60 percent of REE production in the country is
considered gray/illegal.12 The Bayan Obo mine in the Baotao province produces
50 percent of China’s rare-earth elements. The Sichuan province accounts for
24 to 30 percent of China’s mining, while the remaining quantities come from
the southern provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi.13 While holding
large reserves, Brazil and Vietnam mined miniscule quantities of rare-earth
elements in 2019. Despite a recent increase in global share from 9 percent in

11. Nabeel A. Mancheri, “Chinese Monopoly in Rare Earth Elements: Supply–Demand and Industrial
Applications,” China Report 48, no. 4 (2012), 449–68.
12. Chen and Zheng, “Rare Earth Crisis,” 12.
13. Frank Pothen and Kilian Fink, “A Political Economy of China’s Export Restrictions on Rare Earth
Elements,” Centre for European Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 15-025, 4.
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2018 to 12 percent in 2019 (see figure 1), the United States remains unable to
meet domestic demand as it did in the past.

Figure 1. Geographic distribution of REE production in 2018 and 2019
(Source: US Geological Survey, 2020, mineral commodity summaries 2020)

In the past, the United States was self-reliant and the world’s leading REE
producer. From the mid-1960s through the 1980s, the Mountain Pass mine—
located in California and owned by Molycorp Corporation—was the world’s
primary source of rare-earth oxides. Decades of neglect, underinvestment by the
federal government and academic community, and gradual losses of knowledge
and skilled labor required by this complex industry led to the decline of the
industry. The downward trend culminated with the shutdown of the Mountain
Pass mine in 2002 following regulatory issues and an environmental incident
involving a pipeline spill carrying contaminated water. Consequently, the United
States lost nearly all of its production capacity and became a net importer of
these compounds and metals, with 80 percent of imports originating in China.14
Uses
Rare-earth elements are used in a wide range of consumer goods such as
flat-screen TVs and cellphones. Other important industrial applications are
catalysts for petroleum refinement and automotive catalytic converters, wind
turbines, and hybrid and electric vehicles, among others. Production in the United
States propelled the development of modern military technology, and the new
defense applications bolstered the demand for REE inputs in turn, for jet
fighter engines, Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers, missile guidance
14. US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2020, US Geological Survey (website), 132,
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020.pdf.
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systems, antimissile defenses, satellites, ammunitions, communication systems,
etc.15An oft-cited example of the interdependency between the defense and
the REE sectors is the F-35 fighter jet which requires 920 pounds (417 kg)
of these materials. Also, rare-earth permanent magnets and specialized alloys
are vital to many military weapons systems. Some of these critical components
are exclusively built in China, which represents a threat to national security.16
Nevertheless, the defense uses of rare-earth elements accounts for a relatively
small share of US consumption—between 5 and 10 percent.17
As major economies transition to lower-carbon and renewable energies,
analysts estimate the demand for rare-earth elements will continue to grow rapidly.
Clean-energy technologies, such as hybrid electric vehicles or generators for wind
turbines, could consume up to 40 percent of all REE production by 2040.18 This
figure includes China’s growing downstream sector that now accounts for more
than 80 percent of total global consumption.19 The semiconductor industry—
another strategically important and fast-growing sector—is also becoming a major
consumer of rare-earth elements. Finally, the current lack of alternative sources
plays into the growing demand for these elements. When available, substitutes
tend to be less effective, and the quantity of recycled rare-earth elements remains
limited (for example, materials extracted from batteries, permanent magnets, or
fluorescent lamps).20
Chinese Dominance in the Global Market
For over five decades, China developed high-profile national programs and
devoted laboratories and teams exclusively to the study of rare-earth elements.
This long-term focus yielded significant results and set the conditions for the
country to expand its output of rare-earth elements in the late 1970s and 1980s.21
Chinese leaders then declared these elements “strategic” mineral resources
and, with the country’s high tolerance for environmental degradation and
low cost of exploitation, increased production and exports throughout the
1990s. This increase caused global REE prices to plunge and resulted in
many Western mining companies going bankrupt or significantly reducing
15. Morrison, “Trade Dispute with China,” 2.
16. Yu and Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth,” 2.
17. Alan Beattie, “Rare Earths and a Decade of Failure to Diversify,” Financial Times, September, 25, 2020.
18. International Energy Agency, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions,” World Energy
Outlook Special Report, May 5, 2021; and Mancheri, “Chinese Monopoly,” 262.
19. Nabeel A. Mancheri et al., “Effect of Chinese Policies on Rare Earth Supply Chain Resilience,” Resources,
Conservation & Recycling 142 (2019): 101–12.
20. Butler, “Rare Earth Elements,” 33; and US Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity
Summaries 2020,” 200.
21. Pothen and Fink, “Political Economy,” 13–14; and Cindy Hurst, China’s Rare Earth Elements Industry:
What Can the West Learn? (Washington, DC: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, March 2010),
http://www.iags.org/rareearth0310hurst.pdf%20.
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operations. Beijing shifted toward developing an integrated supply chain
in mining, magnets, and other value-added products and declared the
development of domestic REE industries a strategic goal under the Made
in China 2025 strategy.22 The PRC now controls most of the global value
chain and accounts for nearly 90 percent of global REE refining capacity. In
contrast, the United States must export its domestically mined ores to China
for further processing because it lacks the refining, alloying, and fabricating
capacity. This gap is not due to technological preeminence but rather Beijing’s
earlier tolerance for pollution and environmental degradation.23 Production
of rare-earth elements comes with an enormous environmental footprint—
one ton can generate up to 60,000 cubic meters of waste gas, 200 cubic meters of
acid-containing sewage water, and over one ton of radioactive waste.24
China recently began consolidating its control over the industry to keep
prices high, reduce environmental pollution, and grant Chinese processors
access to low-cost materials.25 This consolidation is a stark reminder the Western
for-profit businesses are not competing on a level playing field. Chinese
authorities began setting up export quotas between 2007 and 2014. This policy,
however, was not legally binding and many miners continued to exceed their
output limits. Also, export restrictions were not applied to finished REE
products so China continued to flood global markets with relatively cheap
products. In 2014, after years of contention, the World Trade Organization
declared these export quotas incompatible with trading rules. Following this
decision, the PRC replaced export quotas with production quotas which have
remained fairly stable since 2014. The ongoing consolidation of the industry
into six state-owned enterprises is also central to efforts to tackle illegal or
environmentally noncompliant mining operations.
Beijing also began focusing on ensuring the reserves remain plentiful and
established commercial and national stockpiles managed by the China State
Reserve Bureau. Since annual production includes stockpiling a share of REE
materials, the PRC can impact global markets by manipulating its stockpile levels
and influence market prices by increasing or releasing its strategic reserves for a
limited period.26 Chinese authorities also attempt to attract foreign investors to
establish mining and processing facilities in the country with the lure of access to
raw materials, metals, alloys, and the burgeoning Chinese market. Nonetheless,
some foreign investors remain hesitant because of technology-sharing concerns.
22. Jamie Smyth, “US-China: Washington Revives Plans for Its Rare Earths Industry,” Financial Times,
Big Read, September 14, 2020.
23. Yu and Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth,” 4.
24. Chen and Zheng, “What Happens,” 11, 1288.
25. Mancheri et al., “Effect of Chinese Policies,” 101–12.
26. Polina Klossek, Jakob Kullik, and Karl Gerald van den Boogaart, “A Systemic Approach to the Problems
of the Rare Earth Market,” Resources Policy 50 (2016): 131–40.
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Overcoming China’s Control over Market Prices
The surge in prices of rare-earth elements in 2010–11 revealed the vulnerability
of Western nations to disruptions in the supply chain and triggered a wave of
studies, government reports, and legislative efforts proposing solutions to this
dependency. Popular recommendations include increasing and diversifying mining
and processing activities, investing in research and development to find substitute
materials, and lowering usage intensity or expanding recycling. A 2017 study by
Sprecher et al. proposed a framework with mechanisms to improve resilience
in supply chains.27 The first step is the diversification of supply by promoting
production in different countries or expanding recycling programs. Second, the
stockpiling of materials can serve as a buffer against temporary supply disruptions.
On the demand side, US manufacturers can develop technologies that reduce
usage or allow for substitution. As previously discussed, the Trump administration
proposed a multipronged approach to this issue through Executive Order 13817.
These efforts will face important economic challenges. First, investments in this
sector are technically complex, take at least 10 years to materialize, and require
a hard-to-find, skilled workforce and significant financial resources (typically
over $1 billion USD). Furthermore, global pricing is far from transparent and
is often affected by Chinese domestic policies. Due to the lack of information
on real REE production or break-even costs in China, Western producers find it
difficult to price their products competitively. This market uncertainty also exposes
investors to prohibitive short-term risks and precludes new investments and the
diversification of this supply chain.28 After all, international financial markets
have not forgotten recent bankruptcies of US and Australian mining operations.
In this market environment, proposed solutions must first recognize the global
market is not a level playing field and market-based actors are competing against a
state-capitalist economy that subsidizes and controls its domestic sector.
A growing number of industry experts suggest market forces alone will not
enable the development of alternative supply chains. Instead, they highlight the
need for significant public funding and continued government support.29 This is,
in part, because of China’s history of flooding the market with cheap rare-earth
elements when it perceives credible competition from other nations. Economists
call this behavior limit pricing, and it involves a monopolistic firm reducing
its prices to the point where new firms will not be able to make any profit or
even enter the market. While this action may lower potential short-term profits
27. Benjamin Sprecher et al., “Novel Indicators for the Quantification of Resilience in Critical Material
Supply Chains, with a 2010 Rare Earth Crisis Case Study,” Environmental Science and Technology, 51 (2017),
3860–70.
28. Klossek, Kullik, and van den Boogaart, “Systemic Approach,” 131–40; and Mancheri et. al., “Effect of
Chinese Policies,” 101–12.
29. Smyth, “Washington Revives Plans,” 6, 4.
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of the monopolistic firms, it also enables them to maintain their position and
long-term profitability. Limit pricing is less effective against new competitors
capable of absorbing losses over time. The past financial problems and subsequent
bankruptcies of Molycorp and Lynas, however, seem to indicate otherwise.
Furthermore, limit pricing is more effective for industries with significant
economies of scale. Entry in these types of markets is difficult and limited to a
very small number of firms because of the very large required investments.30
The Chinese use of limit pricing impacts Western production and supply
chains through three different channels: (1) impact its competitor’s profitability,
(2) discourage recycling, and (3) erode the need for building up strategic stockpiles.
Competitors’ Profitability
China can depress global prices and render Western competitors economically
unviable by increasing official production quotas or easing the crackdown on
illegal mining operations. The Chinese government can also support temporary
export surges by depleting its strategic REE reserves. Hence, Western governments
and investors must be prepared to endure temporary losses while recognizing
the use of limit pricing presents perils for China as well.31 First, Chinese mining
companies will provide resistance to lower market prices since this action will
lower their short-term profits. Second, China’s economic planners failed to
predict the rapid surge in domestic consumption of rare-earth elements and the
recent decreases in domestic production that followed the industry consolidation
and tougher enforcement of environmental regulations.32 Thus, it is unlikely
China will employ price limiting for prolonged periods of time as it would divert
valuable resources away from its processing industry. Lastly, surges in production
and exports would accelerate the depletion of this nonrenewable resource.
Building a Recycling Program
Levels of reuse and recycling of products containing rare-earth elements
remain modest worldwide, and the volume of these elements embedded in
existing products or waste streams continues to be a mostly untapped source.
This lack of reuse is largely explained by low market prices, logistical
complexities, high set-up costs, and negative environmental impacts associated
with recycling programs, mainly the use of toxic substances and the large amounts
of energy required to separate rare-earth elements from recycled materials.33
30. Jamie Smyth, “Industry Needs a Rare Earths Supply Chain outside China” Financial Times,
September 25, 2020.
31. Smyth, “Industry Needs Rare Earths, 6; and Beattie, “Failure to Diversify,” 4.
32. Butler, “Rare Earth Elements,” 30.
33. Beattie, “Failure to Diversify,” 2.
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A number of federally-supported, ongoing efforts in the United States seek to
increase the reuse and recycling of rare-earth elements. As long as Beijing retains
its pricing power, however, recycling alone will not close the wide gap between
demand and supply in the near future.34 Thus, the US government and its allies
must develop long-term recycling program incentives and exploit alternative
sources resilient to temporary price manipulations by China.
Building National Stockpiles
The National Defense Stockpile, established by the US Congress in 1939
(Title 50 United States Code § 98 et seq.) to decrease or avert dependency
on foreign sources for supplies of strategic and critical materials in times
of national emergency, was designed to store materials for a three-year war
scenario and now includes 40 different commodities stockpiled nationwide,
including rare-earth elements.35 Policymakers and pundits argue end users
should augment stockpile levels of raw material and REE-based critical
components to cope with temporary market disruptions or supply bottlenecks—
even if that augmentation means building reserves large enough to sustain
production for several years. Procuring and storing large reserves can be a risky
and costly decision. For example, Western governments and businesses could
capitalize on a Chinese-induced market glut by building up strategic stockpiles
at reduced prices. If prices remain low for longer periods of time, however,
holding large stockpiles would become financially unattractive. Also, the
development of new technologies could render long-term stockpiles obsolete and
create significant losses for the holders.
Since military technology requires only limited quantities of rare-earth
elements, diminishing supplies from China would not impact the US military
complex if the US government and industry maintain reserve levels large
enough to sustain manufacturing operations for several years and enough active
Western mining operations remain in line. These stockpiles should be part
of the US government’s and manufacturers’ risk management strategies and
may require public subsidies and international cooperation (for example,
development of a multinational consortium on REE stocking that involves
multiple NATO countries). The reserves should serve as a temporary tool to
absorb short-lived market disruptions until the United States can become selfreliant in mining and processing.

34. Chen and Zheng, “What Happens,” 16.
35. Heidi M. Peters, “Defense Primer: Acquiring Specialty Metals, Rare Earth Magnets, and Tungsten,”
Congressional Research Service, In Focus, January 30, 2020; and Humphries, “Rare Earth Elements,” 21.
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Proposed Long-term Solutions
This section proposes a series of longer-term solutions for Western countries
to counter China’s dominance in the global market. These measures are
well-aligned with the current market environment where Beijing is unable to
use limit pricing as in the past due to its own shortages and recent strategic goals
set by the US government (for example, Department of Energy).36
Creation of an Integrated Domestic Processing Industry
An integrated approach will enable the United States to manufacture the
component parts needed by the military complex and the emerging green
economy. If the United States expands its mining without developing a domestic
refining and manufacturing capacity, the country will move its dependency risk
along the supply chain. The following two highly probable scenarios underscore
the urgent need for building domestic value-added refining, metal production, and
alloying capacity in tandem with an expansion in domestic mining.
In scenario 1, China reduces its production and increases its imports.
China is now a major consumer of raw rare-earth elements while its domestic
production continues to decrease due to environmental and other policy
constraints. The country, therefore, will have to increase its imports of REE
concentrates or establish mining operations in other parts of the world, which
would help them circumvent the negative environmental consequences generated
by the industry. Both options will increase global competition for these raw
materials and reduce availability for refiners outside China (for example, in
the United States). Hence, the development of a US refining industry will
inexorably depend on reliable access to raw materials mined in the United States
or by its allies.
In scenario 2, China increases its production and decreases its imports. If
the PRC increases production and reduces imports, Western mining operations
dependent on China as an export market would be adversely impacted. Very few
smelters and processors outside the country can produce REE oxides and metals.
A US vertically integrated sector would guarantee a stable destination market
for Western mining operations and may be the only path to attract the investor
financing needed for this risky sector.37 In order to expand its refining capacity,
the United States must play catch-up and make significant investments toward
rebuilding a skilled labor force and establishing a comprehensive research
infrastructure. This step will require political will and significant public spending
36. US Department of Energy, Critical Minerals and Materials.
37. Humphries, “Rare Earth Elements.”
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to develop lasting partnerships between the US government, higher-education
institutions, and stakeholders from the mining and financing industries. It is
important to remember, Beijing channeled significant resources for decades
to develop world-class scientific institutes focused exclusively on researching
rare-earth elements. The United States will need to make an equal commitment
to regain its first-place standing in the global marketplace.38
Increased Collaboration, New Procurement Strategies, and New Technologies
Certain REE materials do not exist in the United States and others are not
available in economical quantities, so refining specific rare-earth elements
may not be cost-effective domestically. Western nations can address these
challenges via public policies, technological breakthroughs, and cooperation. The
United States, the European Union, Japan, and Australia began setting up new
programs involving coordination and research funding for domestic operations.
At the federal level, as proposed in Executive Order 13817, the Department
of Defense can foster collaboration with friendly nations and their businesses by
employing mechanisms, such as reciprocal defense procurement or security of
supply arrangements, to ensure the widest supply of defense goods and services.
These arrangements could expand the participation of allies and strategic
partners in US defense procurement processes and guarantee acquisitions of
rare-earth elements to meet pressing warfighter and industrial needs. For example,
in August 2020, Ellen Lord, Department of Defense undersecretary of defense
for acquisition and sustainment, announced the Pentagon was in early talks with
Australia to have the country process a significant portion of rare-earth materials
for the US military.39 Also, three US and Canadian companies have joined
efforts to set up a supply chain using radioactive monazite sands—a mining
by-product. This collaboration will integrate the different phases of production,
including mining and refinement, and will produce enough monazite to meet
half of the United States’ needs.40
End users of rare-earth elements are also key stakeholders who can shape
the market through their procurement practices because lower-tier managers
often make procurement decisions driven mostly by low-cost considerations,
translating to purchases of cheap Chinese supplies. The United States needs
a more strategic and coordinated approach to procurement that should involve
38. Pothen and Fink, “Political Economy,” 13.
39. Reuters Staff, “Pentagon in Talks with Australia on Rare Earths Plant: Official,” Reuters (website), August 27,
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-rareearths-australia/pentagon-in-talks-with-australia-on-rare
-earths-plant-official-idUSKCN1VH1UY.
40. “A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,” Exec. Order 13817,
December 26, 2017, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/12/26/2017-27899/a-federal-strategy-to
-ensure-secure-and-reliable-supplies-of-critical-minerals.
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chief executives and government agencies. Finally, ongoing efforts to increase
processing and manufacturing efficiency would lower material intensity and
minimize waste. A new major technological breakthrough in the industry
could make an impact akin to the contribution of fracking technology to
US energy independence.
Conclusion
Rare-earth elements are strategic resources with multiple business and
technological applications. Due to China’s global dominance in the market,
the US manufacturing and military sectors are vulnerable to potential Chinese
political and economic aggression. Control over the supply chains should be
an issue of extreme concern for Western nations because it has been for the
Chinese government. While the vulnerability of the US military complex
often captures headlines and the attention of policymakers, the threat to the
economy is much broader and more concerning.
For example, commitments made by US and international automakers to
increase the number of electric vehicles in their fleets is gaining momentum.
With its vertically integrated supply chain, China now holds over 70 percent
of the world’s electric-vehicle battery manufacturing capacity, whereas the
United States possesses less than 10 percent of the share. Moreover, Beijing
has set the goal to produce 50 percent of the world’s electric vehicles and 50
percent of the world’s hybrid vehicles by 2025.41 Any delays in the development
of alternative REE supplies gives the PRC more time to consolidate its market
position and develop new monopolies in these fast-growing economic sectors.
Following the 2010 market disruption and decades of talks, good intentions,
and feeble financial commitments, Western nations have yet to change the status
quo. This lack of action was partly due to Beijing’s decision to flood the global
market with rare-earth elements at subsidized prices, driving out for-profit
competitors and dissuading new market entrants. A new window of opportunity
is opening for Western businesses as demand for rare-earth elements in the
PRC currently exceeds domestic supply.42 Facing its own shortages, China will
no longer be able to use limit pricing as it did in the past. This new market
reality, coupled with financial backing from their respective governments, could
provide Western producers enough time to emerge. Furthermore, Beijing knows

41. Smyth, “Washington Revives Plans,” 7.
42. Yu and Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth,” 4.
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any overly aggressive move it makes will further galvanize its rivals to develop
their own production and processing capacities.
Establishing a viable supply chain for rare-earth elements will take years
and will require the United States to remain focused on long-term solutions.
These efforts should include stockpiling and recycling, increasing domestic
production and refining, and investing in joint ventures with trusted strategic
partners. In order to succeed, these ventures will require significant public
investments and enduring public support. Heavier involvement of Washington
in this market may face domestic political headwinds and challenges in the
international arena (for example, Beijing leading a complaint at the World
Trade Organization). As China continues to lose market power and domestic
political backing for REE independence gains momentum, the United States
is well-poised to use the defense complex and create cutting-edge industries to
break this long-lasting dependency.

Gustavo Ferreira
Captain Gustavo Ferreira, PhD, is a senior agricultural economist with the
US Department of Agriculture and serves as an agricultural officer (38G)
at the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. He holds a PhD in
agricultural economics from Louisiana State University, a master of business
administration degree from McNeese State University, and a bachelor in
economics degree from Lusiada University (Portugal).
Jamie Critelli
Major Jamie Critelli is a civil affairs officer serving in the 353rd Civil Affairs
Command, US Army Reserves, as an agricultural officer (38G). He is an
independent farm business owner and has worked globally in agriculture
supply chain roles on five continents. He graduated with honors from Cornell
University and holds a masters of business administration degree in supply-chain
management from Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH), Zurich.

72

Parameters 52(1) Spring 2022

Select Bibliography
Butler, Charles J. “Rare Earth Elements: China’s Monopoly and
Implications for U.S. National Security.” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs
38, no. 1 (Winter, 2014).
Chen, Yufeng, and Biao Zheng. “What Happens after the Rare Earth
Crisis: A Systematic Literature Review.” Sustainability (2019). https://
www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/5/1288/htm.
Mancheri, Nabeel A. “Chinese Monopoly in Rare Earth Elements: Supply–
Demand and Industrial Applications.” China Report 48, no. 4 (2012).
Mancheri, Nabeel A., et al. “Effect of Chinese Policies on Rare Earth
Supply Chain Resilience,” Resources, Conservation & Recycling 142 (2019).
Klossek, Polina, Jakob Kullik, and Karl Gerald van den Boogaart. “A
Systemic Approach to the Problems of the Rare Earth Market.” Resources
Policy 50 (2016).
Schlinkert, Dominik, and Karl Geraldvan den Boogaart. “The Development
of the Market for Rare Earth Elements: Insights from Economic Theory.”
Resources Policy 46 (2015).
Sprecher, Benjamin, et al. “Novel Indicators for the Quantif ication
of Resilience in Critical Material Supply Chains, with a 2010 Rare
Earth Crisis Case Study.” Environmental Science and Technology (2017).
pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/acs.est.6b05751.

